While from time to time VAW catches the attention of the media (especially in recent years) it is certainly by no means a recent phenomenon. It has, however, only been in the last few decades that the law has been used specifically to protect women from gendered violence.
It seems almost inconceivable now to note that marital rape remained 'legal' in England and Wales until 1991. It took the English courts almost two centuries to abolish the common law rule that prohibited a male spouse from being prosecuted for raping his wife; finally meeting its death knell in the House of Lords decision in R v R. 10 In that case, Lord Keith of Kinkel in his leading speech reflected that 'the fiction of implied consent has no useful purpose to serve today in the law of rape' -as if it really ever had. The case of R v R is a stark reminder of how slow the courts (and Parliament) have been to challenge and amend patriarchal formulations of English law. Part of the problem was that women's experiences of violence remained largely hidden until victimologists and government agencies began to investigate it during the latter part of the 20 th century. 11 The seminal work of notable feminist activists and academics in the 1970s, 80s and 90s has been pivotal in bringing female victimisation to the fore of public and political debate.
12
Significant to this article is that the majority of violent acts targeted against women are committed by men, highlighting the often gendered nature of much female victimisation. 13 It is by no means new to feminist literature to highlight the gendered dynamics of VAW. Sexual offences and domestic violence have, in particular, been conceptualised as conducts which are intended to subjugate and subordinate women, while simultaneously enforcing a maledominated social hierarchy. 14 Indeed, the conceptualisation of gendered violence as a form of male hegemony is now a well-trodden path within feminist and socio-legal scholarship. 15 Yet despite the gendered nature of many forms of VAW, this area of legal and criminological 8 As well as other social and cultural practices which have the effect of subjugating the rights and freedoms of women. 9 See also C. Watts and C. Zimmerman, 'Violence Against Women: Global Scope and Magnitude ' (2002) considering the possible extension of the legislative framework on hate crime to include sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity within the current aggravated offences prescribed under sections 29-32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Yet no mention is made of gender-based hostility. In his theory paper which accompanies the Commission's consultation paper, John Stanton-Ife provides only a fleeting reference to gender, noting that:
In the case of women victims, for example, a question to explore would be the extent to which women victims of relevant crimes have been selected in virtue of being women.
18
It is to this question which this article focuses. The paper will, in the main, direct its attention on the specific offence of rape. Rape is often a clear demonstration of male dominance over women 19 and it is a salient example of when gendered violence might become a 'hate crime '. 20 Like most other examples of VAW, the majority of rape victims are women with the offenders being men. 21 Moreover rape, unlike intimate partner violence, is a specific offence which can only be committed by men.
22 16 There is no one agreed definition of hate crime, but common amongst most descriptions is that it includes offences which are motivated, or partly motivated, by prejudice, bigotry, or animus based on the victim's group-based identity traits. See This perspective of rape as a form of male dominance and control over women is a macro-oriented feminist approach to examining gender-based violence and has been criticised for 'failing to explain same-sex interpersonal violence… [and] ignoring the fact that women may also be violent within intimate relationships.' 23 While we do not intend to ignore the fact that women as well and men can be violent, and that same-sex violence can and does occur frequently in both incidents of sexual and intimate relationship violence, we wish to highlight the fact that women are much more likely to be the victims of such crimes because they are women. 24 It is this specific fact which brings the issue of VAW within a discussion about hate crime policy. Of particular concern to us is that despite many improvements in gender equality and criminal justice responses to gendered violence, the crime of rape remains a prevalent and serious issue in 21 st Century Britain -one that remains underreported and, in turn, rarely prosecuted.
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This article starts by critically exploring the various conceptual parallels that exist between rape and 'hate crime'. 26 While it is argued that many incidents of sexual violence can fall within criminological conceptions of hate crime, it does not necessarily follow that such crimes should fall within the current framework of hate crime legislation. There are myriad reasons why gender-based violence (such as rape) should and should not be included within hate crime policy/law. This article explores the pros and cons of including gender 'hostility'
within what is at times a contentious policy arena. It concludes that gender 'hostility' should be included within hate crime legislation in order to recognise, and additionally combat, the bias nature of various forms of VAW.
statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/hosb1011/hosb1011?view=Binary [accessed 23 rd April 2012]. Same-sex intimate partner violence is also common, see Hodge, n 2 above, 13. 23 ibid, 14. 24 ibid. 25 The CSEW found that just one in seven victims had told the police about the incident (15 per cent 
HATE CRIME: THE POLICY CONTEXT
It has only been in the last 15 years that the term 'hate crime' has entered political and academic discourse in the UK. 27 It was during this time that various high profile racist attacks and murders caught the attention of the media. 28 The murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 was a particular turning point with media coverage resulting in political attention given to the needs of commonly victimised minority groups. 29 The preponderance with 'racist crime', however, meant that policies aimed at tackling hate crime more generally were developed using what has now become labelled as the 'racial animus' model. 30 This model provides that for a crime to become a 'racist' offence it must be at least partly 'motivated' by racial animosity towards the Lepiné's victims were shot solely on the basis that they were female, the victims had no previous relationship with the attacker, and they were, for all intents and purposes, interchangeable objects who were selected because of a hatred Lepiné felt towards women. 71 As with other forms of prejudice, misogyny can be described as a type of hatred of women, or within the legal lexicon gender-based 'hostility'. 72 Men are taught to harbour gender animus as a result of their socialisation process, and in the context of structural power relations between men and women, learn to see -and denigrate -women as inherently inferior. 73 This process involves the propagation of negative stereotypes and expectations about women and their sexual roles and in the case of rape can lead to attitudes of victim-blaming towards rape victims, as well as 'rape myths' which serve to justify why men seek to exercise violent sexual power over women.
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Parallels of impact
Rape is a violation both of the body and mind, and as such many women experience immense psychological and physical harms. 75 As we have already alluded to above, rape is a crime which remains omnipresent throughout society. 76 According to recent data from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) there was an estimated 366,000 -442,000 sexual offences committed against women in the last year. 77 During 2011/12 the police recorded 53,665 sexual offences, of which 14,767 were rapes of a female, and 1,274 were rapes of a male. 78 The disproportionate number of sexual offences committed against women has meant that gender has been considered a 'risk factor'. 79 The risk of sexual violence (and others forms 68 Groths' research found that most rapists were actually blends of power and anger motivations, meaning that the feelings of anger are often associated with the desire to control women. 81 Multiple victimisation is common at the hands of both current and ex-partners.
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The often repeated nature of much sexual violence is, in many respects, similar to other types of hate crime. In relation to racist violence, Benjamin Bowling notes that incidents cannot be 'reducible to an isolated incident, or even a collection of incidents,' 83 but rather they are likely to make a process of structural and personal experiences of violence, which is the result of their racial background. 84 Mark Walters and Carolyn Hoyle have also highlighted the repeated nature of hate crime via their research into community mediation. 85 They found that many of the cases that they researched 'could be characterized as long-term targeted hate abuse' which were committed by people known to the offenders. 86 The 'process of victimisation' uncovered by researchers examining both hate crime and gendered violence provide evidence of the similarities between these discrete forms of crime. Such findings counter the outdated perception that both types of violence are committed by deranged strangers in dark alleyways.
The consequences of (repeated) rape and other types of hate crime are also comparable. Even if we were to accept interchangeability as a prerequisite for hate crime, this should still not preclude rape or domestic violence from being classified as being potentially aggravated by gender hostility. This is because victims of acquaintance/intimate rapes or domestic violence may well be interchangeable in the minds of their attackers. 123 Although the victim is not selected randomly she will be interchangeable in the sense that the offender will express gender hostility towards any woman that he becomes intimately involved with.
Statistics already highlighted above show that gendered violence is often repeated over prolonged periods of time, with offenders abusing and raping women they know because they 116 Rothschild, n 20 above. 117 Hodge, n 2 above. 118 133 Though it should be noted that some studies have highlighted that some hate crime laws are being disproportionately used to prosecute certain minority group offenders, see for e.g., Burney & Rose, n 48 above. 134 See Iganski, n 93 above. 135 See Walters, n 52 above. 136 Deterrence is best understood in absolute terms rather than as specific or individual forms of deterrence. It is unlikely that the law will have any individual deterrent effects on offenders who may instead see their additional punishment as unfair, leading to further resentment towards certain others. However, this does not mean that hate crime laws cannot reduce hate crime offences. More likely is that the law will provide a message of social condemnation for prejudice motivated conducts which over long periods of time can filter through to public (un)acceptance of certain prejudice-motivated conducts. For further discussion on this see ibid. 137 Iganski, n 93, 87.
While it is unlikely that hate crime legislation will deter the 'unthinking racist' who lashes out in the 'heat of the moment', 138 the criminalisation of racially motivated offences when combined with a criminal justice apparatus specifically designed to tackle hate crime, 139 is likely to deter at least some people from committing hate crime. 140 The law clearly has an important role in shaping the ways in which society thinks about certain forms of victimisation. 141 We believe this to be especially the case considering the fact that state has itself been guilty of proliferating practices, policies and laws which have historically supported social environments through which hate crimes have thrived. 142 We need only remind ourselves of the example of legal exemption to marital rape, mentioned in the introduction to this article, to reflect on how the law has been used to justify the subjugation and oppression of women through violence. Other forms of targeted abuse have also emerged as a direct result of state practices and laws which have at their heart the subjugation of certain identity groups. The introduction of slavery and racial segregation are but two historical examples of the use of state power to repress certain minority groups. In more modern times the use of anti-terrorism legislation and government policies on state security have arguably resulted in anger and anxieties directed towards Muslim communities, and in turn to hate crime. 143 Iganski is apt to reflect that:
…if the state plays an important role in providing an environment in which 'hate crime' can flourish, the state can therefore also potentially play a role in eroding that environment.
Key to this article is the question of whether the inclusion of gender within hate crime law will help to 'erode' the patriarchal environment 144 which supports the acceptance of gendered violence and the culture of blame attached to its victims. In order to answer this question it is instructive for us to examine the declaratory power of current offences aimed at tackling VAW.
We use again the offence of rape as a particularly salient example of the use of the law to tackle gendered violence.
The law on sexual offences was vastly overhauled 10 years ago under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. 145 Wide sweeping changes were made as a response to the old law being perceived as 'archaic, incoherent, and discriminatory.' 146 In particular, greater clarification of the concept of 'consent' was required while gender neutrality was necessary if the law was to limit gender discrimination within this area of law. Moreover, changes in both law and policy were needed in order to encourage victims to report sexual offences in an attempt at increasing official detections. 147 Prior to the 2003 Act, significant amendments had been made to the law on rape in the 1970s and 1990s. 149 The inclusion of marital rape was incorporated into the common law in 1991 150 and male rape was introduced into the statutory framework in 1994, 151 while a new limitation on the use of sexual history evidence was enacted under section 41 of the Youth and
Criminal Evidence Act 1999. 152 However, although there have been many advances in law, procedure and practice, 153 problems still remain with the current legislative framework. 154 Baroness Stern in her review into how rape complaints are handled by public authorities observed that the policies and laws that are now enacted onto the statute books are the 'rights ones', however the real failure remains with the implementation of such laws. 155 Of significant concern is that there remains a stubbornly high attrition rate. 156 Attrition refers to the numbers and percentage of rape cases that do not end up reaching court or result in a guilty verdict.
Even if rape is reported to the police, the case may not be recorded as a crime or proceed to court. 157 A large number of cases 'drop out' of the process before reaching trial, and for these women the sense of injustice can be victimising itself. 158 Research has suggested that the high attrition rate may be partly due to the way in which criminal justice practitioners respond to complaints. 159 Stern notes that "There is a long history of disbelief, disrespect, blaming the victim, not seeing rape as a serious violation, and therefore deciding not to record it as a crime". 160 While there have been vast improvements in this regard, there remains an extensive body of empirical evidence to suggest that many justice practitioners and members of the public continue to view rape victims as partly to blame for their own victimisation. 161 According to a study carried out by Amnesty International 26 per cent of the respondents believed that if a woman was wearing provocative or sexy clothing, then she was totally or partially responsible for being raped. 162 Of equal concern is that out of the relatively small number of perpetrators that do face prosecution, an even smaller number end up facing conviction. 163 Currently the conviction rate remains low at 6.5 per cent. 164 The reasons why cases do not result in a conviction have been linked to both individual and institutionalised misconceptions of rape, such as stereotypes, bias and prejudice towards the alleged rape victim -all of which are gendered. 165 A number of studies have shown that the acceptance of 'rape myths' remains prevalent amongst members of the public (and jurors); such as that 'real rape' is committed by a stranger. 166 We believe that all of these strategies will play a significant role in addressing gendered violence. However, the law must simultaneously remain a means through which the state effectively challenges such behaviours. One way in which rape, and potentially other types of gendered violence, can be re-framed is through the law of hate crime. By including gender identity within hate crime legislation, many offences of rape would be understood, not just as acts of sexual abuse, but as acts of prejudice used against women to oppress, subordinate and control them. 183 Such a reorientation of causation could help to diminish the perceived 'responsibility' of victims by shifting emphasis onto the offender's wrongful, immoral and discriminatory conduct. 184 There is the potential, therefore, for hate crime law to directly challenge those 'rape myths' that continue to undermine the effectiveness of the Sexual 191 Carney, n 20 above, 40. 192 We set out in the following section when there may be evidence of gender hostility and when this might be difficult to prove beyond reasonable belief.
Notwithstanding the arguments in favour of additional censure for rape offenders, one might remain sceptical about the denunciatory power of the law in relation to the crime of rape considering the stigma that is already attached to this offence. As Rothschild 193 notes:
While anecdotal evidence suggests that a hate crime conviction is the first thing a defendant wants plea bargained off his record when subject to prosecution for assault or battery, it is not clear that the threat of such a conviction on a rapists record will add much incremental deterrence in relation to the already significant censure which will accompany the label of rapist.
However, questions about whether the additional stigma of 'hate' will have any deterrent effect on individual offenders are less important to us than the impacts that it may have on broadly held social attitudes towards rape perpetrators and victims. Indeed most research indicates that increasing criminal sanctions has little direct impact on crime rates. 194 Rather it is the potential for longer term norm creation which is of greatest significance. An important purpose of hate crime law is to shape social mores by policing the boundaries of acceptable behaviour. 195 While it may be the case that many people believe that rape is a gendered crime, this is not necessarily a view held by the majority of people and therefore enhancing the punishment for some rape offenders under the hate crime label could 'serve as a legal imprimatur on the definition of rape '. 196 In this sense, reframing some incidents of gendered violence as being about 'hate' could empower victims by shifting blame away from them and onto their offenders and thus helping to validate their experiences. 197 Such relabeling may help to encourage victims to report rapes, by incrementally improving the perception that their experiences will be taken seriously both by criminal justice practitioners and other members of the community. 198 The failure to include the option for 'gender aggravated' rape under UK hate crime legislation ignores the evidence that rape affects women collectively as a group, similar to those groups currently included under hate crime laws. 199 Furthermore, exclusion may actually perpetrate the myths surrounding why men choose to rape women. 200 In other words, the state's refusal to acknowledge gendered violence as gendered 'hostility' may actually send an unintended counter message that gendered crimes are not gendered at all. This, in turn, feeds directly into misogynistic beliefs about women being partly to blame for their own victimisation.
201
While the labelling of some offenders of rape as 'hate-motivated rapists' may well help to challenge the gendered notions of victimisation which have proliferated over the centuries, there remains one concerning ramification of pursuing rape as 'hate crime'. That is, if the state begins to label some rapists as hate crime offenders and not others, a perception may arise that some rapes are worse than others. This is indeed a possibility; one which may result in some feminist scholars/lobbyists being reluctant to pursue the inclusion of gender in hate crime policy. We certainly do not wish to advocate a policy domain which actively creates a hierarchy of rape seriousness. However, we also believe that it is equally, if not more important, that the criminal law and sentencers have the ability to consider a range of aggravating and mitigating factors when determining the seriousness of an offence. There is a vast list of features which will aggravate an offence, including ones which change the type of offence an offender is charged with and those which are applied only at sentencing to enhance an offender's penalty. 202 For example, the commission of an assault committed against an elderly victim may result in aggravation at sentencing if it is determined that the victim's age made him or her additionally vulnerable to the offender's actions. 203 In the case of racially motivated assault, the offence of assault is relabelled to that of 'racially aggravated assault' in recognition of the higher level of seriousness. The fact that the crime is motivated by prejudice enhances both the offender's culpability (i.e. his blameworthiness for committing the offence increases) and the harms caused by the offence. 204 While we certainly agree that most incidents of sexual violence can at least partly be explained by gender-based animus, we foresee several practical (and to a lesser extent conceptual) problems with such a conclusion. If gender-based hate is to be transposed successfully into law there must first be clear evidence of gender hostility from which a criminal court can then add the additional label of 'hate crime'. 210 The issue here is that it is up to the finder of fact, and not the judge, to determine whether identity-based hostility was present during the commission of an offence -based on the facts and context of the incident. 211 The very fact that a woman has been raped may well provide a conceptual inference of gender 'hostility', but it doubtful that it can in itself provide conclusive (or even presumptive) evidence of it from which a jury can satisfy itself that 'hate' was present during the commission of the offence. This is because violence directed against women will frequently involve a range of 205 Hodge, n 2 above; Lawrence, n 30 above. 206 situational and psychological factors (such as alcohol abuse, psychiatric and personality disorders) and/or as Nancy Crowell and Ann Burgess assert, the physiology of men. 212 Thus while it is difficult to challenge the claim that almost all rapes are 'gendered', it will be more challenging to convince juries that there is, in every case, an expression of gender-based 'hostility'.
One issue which will remain contestable (both in court and academia) is whether notions of power and control can always be intrinsically linked to notions of prejudice in cases involving sexual violence. Inevitably it will be asserted that desires to demonstrate power and control are rooted, not to hatred, but to other internalised psychological problems. These 'problems' may be the result of an offender's own childhood traumas, neglect and/or experiences of (sexual) abuse. 213 It could be argued that some offenders of 'power rapes', for example, are motivated by a desire to obtain power (which is linked to their feelings of weakness and/or powerlessness) rather than their wanting to exert control. There is a subtle but important distinction here. For example, offender A may desire to obtain power because of an internalised feeling of worthlessness. This can be compared to offender B whose desire to exert control over others emanates from his appetite to suppress women in order to keep them in 'their place'. The actions of both offenders may well be 'gendered' in that in order to obtain power or exert control they specifically target women. However, while the victim's gender is central to understanding both motivations, it could be argued that it is only the second offender
who intends 214 to demonstrate gender hostility.
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In relation to racist hate crime, Ray et al have used a similar social-psychological approach to explaining the difference between internal and external feelings of hatred. 216 They assert that many racist hate crimes are best explained, not by referring to the hatred that offenders have for their victim's identity, but rather are the result of unacknowledged shame . 214 Or at least recklessly foresees that he will demonstrate gender hostility, see Walters, n 52 above. 215 It may also be difficult to prove that there is an 'objective' demonstration of gender hostility (as prescribed under s 28(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998; see also Rogers [2007] UKHL 8). The jury would have to determine whether the offender objectively demonstrated gender hostility based on the facts and context of the case. Such demonstrations are typically evidenced by prejudiced language, without such evidence of hostility it is often difficult to prove the presence of hostility beyond reasonable doubt.
that is experienced within themselves. 217 This shame refers to their own place within society, which for many offenders is one of socio-economic disadvantage and educational underachievement. Rather than acknowledging their feelings of shame regarding their own shortcomings, some offenders will project their insecurities onto those more vulnerable than themselves, and it is these victims they go on to see as to blame for their own socio-economic instabilities. As such, they suggest that some hate crimes are not really about hate at all but about internal insecurities which are the result of socio-structural inequalities.
In terms of rape and other forms of gendered violence it too may be argued by lawyers and social psychologists that the main factor compelling the offender was his hatred or loathing of the 'self'-whether acknowledged or not -as against his hatred of the female 'other'.
Without wishing to lend sympathy to the rape offender here, we simply note that many men will be susceptible to the gendered processes that they themselves go onto to perpetuate. The difficulty for legal practitioners and jurors will be to determine whether an offence is one which is motivated, or that demonstrates, gender hostility or one which represents the manifestation of self-loathing on the part of the offender. that gender-motivated crimes 'go beyond an intense dislike for someone, and that such crimes are committed in order to enforce a social hierarchy that is biased toward a particular group.'
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The difficulties faced by prosecutors who do not see the similarities between power and control on the one hand and hate and bias on the other, mean that rape is frequently viewed as qualitatively different from the 'conventional' hate crime model -even if evidence in some cases shows the perpetrator's direct bias against women.
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What this short and rather superficial exploration of power and control tells us is that the reason why people desire power is not always easy to explain. Criminal justice practitioners, juries and judges alike will inevitably be confronted with decisions about whether an offender's violence is motivated by gender hostility or whether it is an expression of power and control Clearly then, rape and other forms of violence directed against women are multifaceted phenomena that will have multiple and intersecting aetiological determinants. The authors wish to be clear that we believe that a significant proportion of sexual violence will be motivated by gender bias and will therefore amount to expressions of 'gender hostility'.
However, it is important to acknowledge the complex reality of sexual violence and that gender 'hostility' will not always be provable, or perhaps even present, in every case that comes before the courts -just as not all violence against gay men are the result of homophobia. Whether the law can differentiate between crimes that are gendered and those which involve gender hostility will be the greatest challenge in bringing 'gender' into the hate crime paradigm. Some of the same evidential problems observed in rape trials will persist in rape/hate crime cases, i.e. it may come down to one person's word against another. 227 As noted above there is also the potential for police officers and prosecutors to refuse to acknowledge the gender bias within many types of crimes. 228 We therefore suggest that the following traits/factors may aid practitioners tasked with identifying evidence of gender hostility:
1. Vocalised hostility such as 'bitch' 'whore' 'slag' 'slut'. 6. The victim's own perception that the violence was used against her in order to put her in 'her place'.
7. An absence of other motivations such material acquisition, a mutual personal dislike of one another, or a prior altercation that was unrelated to gender identity.
Intersectionality
It is clear that there will be various evidential challenges when attempting to prove that VAW is motivated by, or demonstrates, gender hostility. In addition to proving that such hostility exists will be further difficulties where the offender is motivated by multiple and intersecting prejudices. In a recent article aimed at reconceptualising our understanding of hate crimes, Neil
Chakraborti and Jon Garland state the following:
Recognizing that hate crime can be the outcome of prejudice based on multiple, distinct yet connected, lines is important for recognizing the reality behind both the experience of victimization and the commission of the offence.
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The fact that targeted violence is not always based on a single type of hostility, or motivating factor for that matter, is important to our understanding of, and response to, hate crimes.
Victims are often targeted because they are gay and disabled, Muslim and Asian, female and Black. It is not always easy to identify which prejudice is the main motivating factor or whether prejudices based on several identity traits are mutually inclusive. As Ault notes discrete ... create a false dichotomy between the categories 'lesbian' and 'woman' and 'antilesbian' and 'anti-woman'. Anti-lesbian is quintessentially anti-woman; violence against women of all sexual orientations is often overtly 'anti-lesbian'. 230 Perhaps more than any other type of hate crime, gendered violence will concern intersecting prejudices and perceptions of vulnerability. We turn to a recent high profile case study to illustrate this point and to show how such cases can still be dealt with through hate crime laws.
In May 2012 nine Asian men from the northern town of Rochdale were found guilty of a variety of sexual offences committed against a number of young white girls. The victims had been 'groomed' over a sustained period of time and had been plighted with alcohol, drugs and gifts. 231 The offences committed against these young victims included rape, trafficking of girls for sex and conspiracy to engage in sexual activity with a child. Several of the young victims were beaten and forced to have sex with 'several men in a day, several times a week'. 232 The case is notable for several reasons, not least because of the media coverage it garnered, but also because of the insidious debate around race and crime that ensured. 233 For the most part, the gang's crimes were labelled as a case of 'sexual grooming' which were the result of men using their power to gain the sexual gratification they had been lusting after. 234 The issue of vulnerability also became key to those attempting to explain the causes of this case, with the Assistant Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police publicly declaring that the crimes were about 'adults preying on vulnerable young children'. 235 It is of particular relevance to note that the police and CPS were at pains to deny that racial or religious bias had anything to do with the matter, with public statements persistently denying that such was the case. 236 The first author has been less than convinced about either the way in which the vulnerability of the victims was framed, or the denial that racial or religious prejudice had anything to do with the victims' experiences. 237 Walters notes that:
Judge Gerald Clifton at sentencing told the offenders: 'All of you treated [the victims] as though they were worthless and beyond any respect… One of the factors leading to that was the fact that they were not part of your community or religion.'
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The judge's comments when combined with the fact that the offenders specifically targeted only young white women provides a persuasive inference that their crimes were at least partly motivated by racial, religious and gender hostility. Despite this, the judge was never invited to consider any aggravating factors based on racial or religious hostility, while the absence of gender hostility within the legislation meant that this was never going to be an issue. Even after these points were raised in another journal, the Chief Prosecutor for the North West of England responded writing a letter which stated 'I would suggest that Dr Walters in focusing on the supposed hate crime element has in fact misunderstood what these types of grooming cases actually involve.' 239 In response to this we would like to note that 'hate crime' need not be an all-encompassing label but one which can be additionally attached to crimes in cases involving multiple intersecting motives. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 itself makes this very clear by stating that the hostility element of an offence need only be part of an offender's motivation (s. 28(1)(b)), while the legislation also makes it clear that it matters not that the 'offender's hostility is also based, to any extent, on any other factor not mentioned in that paragraph.' (s.
28(3))
. 240 Hence, section 28 of the Act and sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 make it clear that offenders do not need to be solely motivated by one individual type of hostility in order that an offence be classified as a 'hate crime'.
Furthermore, the meaning of the term 'hostility' itself should not just be understood simply as a form of hatred or bigotry but must also include expressions of prejudice whereby a victim is subjugated because of their identity and their 'perceived' vulnerability. 241 Had the hate crime provisions included 'gender', as a protected characteristic, a broader and more holistic understanding of the hostility evident in the Rochdale case may have been reached. To us the case provided evidence of the racial, religious and gendered hostilities all which underpinned the nature of the crimes -as well as issues relating to age and potentially social class. All of these characteristics were relevant to the victim's experiences. Their selection as rape victims came about first and foremost because of their gender, however when this characteristic was combined with their non-religious beliefs, different ethnic background and young age they became highly vulnerable to the offenders' desires to control, use and abuse them. As such we feel that the offenders' hostilities, while not direct motivations of hatred or even bigotry, should have been conceived as demonstrations of prejudice -those which were expressed via a belief that the victims were less worthy of the social respect that the offenders afforded other members of their own male, adult, Asian, Muslim communities. The victims were in effect denied their human dignity by reason of who they were.
The role of identity politics
One of the reasons why offences such as those committed by the Rochdale Gang or Levi
Bellfield have fallen outside of the hate crime paradigm is because there have been very few activists in the political domain calling for their inclusion. In the US, many commentators and women's advocacy groups have long argued for the inclusion of rape in hate crime legislation. 242 Yet there has still to be any unified lobbying efforts for its inclusion in the UK. Conversely, Mason-Bish points out that resistance to the inclusion of gendered violence as hate crime can also be founded on the fear that it will undermine the level of service that is currently offered to victims of rape and domestic violence. 259 The resources and expertise currently on offer to combat gendered violence far outstrips that of hate crime. 260 The fear, then, is that inclusion will undermine the special status that gendered violence currently holds, leaving victims of gender bias offences marginalised by the totality of other forms of hate crime.
Ultimately, the competing political agendas of the anti-hate crime movement and women's rights groups mean that the inclusion of gender is simply too controversial for legislators to seriously consider. women. We do, however, remain more concerned about the potential marginalising effects of subsuming gendered violence into the current hate crime paradigm on smaller marginalised groups. After all, the initial hate crime movement was, like the feminist movement, aimed at uncovering the problem of targeted victimisation and to ensure that ethnic minority groups receive the legal protection they deserve. 
CONCLUSION
This article has argued for the inclusion of 'gender hostility' within the UK's framework of hate crime legislation. 265 The article has used the offence of rape to demonstrate the often biased nature of VAW. The fact that many such crimes involve hostility against women and additionally cause heightened levels of harm amongst women as a group, leads us to the conclusion that gender-motivated crimes should at least be considered as a type of 'hate crime' by those state agencies tasked with tackling the problem. However, it is not just conceptual parallels that can be drawn between gendered violence and other types of hate crime. There are also various moral and practical reasons for its inclusion. In particular, we believe that the law of 'hate crime' would help to challenge the gender bias that persists within the current framework of sexual offences by reformulating certain 'sexual' offences as both 'sexual' and 'hate' crimes. This is not to suggest that all rapes are hate crime. As we have highlighted throughout this paper there must be tangible evidence that can be used to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the offence was motivated, or demonstrated, gender hostility. We believe that where such evidence exists it must be used in order to support the re-orientation of responsibility away from victims by refocusing on the offender's hate-motivation. The 263 P. Gerstenfeld, Hate Crimes: Causes, Control, and Controversies (California: Sage Publications, 2004); see also Hodge, n 2 above. 264 Angelari, n 106 above. 265 Carney, n 20 above.
expressed denunciation conveyed by hate crime laws would additionally assist in supporting social norms that challenge female victimisation while simultaneously rejecting a culture of victim-blame. In particular, the legal proscription of 'gender aggravated rape' would help to eradicate gendered misconceptions about the nature of rape as well as the 'rape myths' which, we believe, continue to hinder the effectiveness of rape law reform.
